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Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates if and how people’s competitiveness 
depends on their own gender and on the gender of people with whom they interact. 
Participants are given information about the gender of the co-participant they are matched 
with, they then choose between a tournament or a piece rate payment scheme, and finally 
perform a real task. As already observed in the literature, we find that significantly more men 
than women choose the tournament. The gender of the co-participant directly influences 
men’s choices (men compete less against other men than against women), but only when the 
gender information is made sufficiently salient.  A higher predicted competitiveness of 
women induces more competition. Giving stronger tournament incentives, or allowing the 
participants to choose the gender of their co-participant, increases women’s willingness to 
compete, but does not close the gender gap in competitiveness. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Men and women hold different types of jobs and are employed in different occupations. 
They also tend to work under different incentive systems, with women being compensated 
by piece rate payment schemes more frequently.1  Relatively few women hold top 
corporate positions, although in many countries women’s educational attainment now 
exceeds men's.2  Fewer women than men have started up their own business (according to 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, in 2002 in the U.K., 3.1% of the female population 
and 6% of the male population contributed to start-up activities;  the same year in France, 
only 26% of start-ups were created by women – SINE survey, INSEE).  Women are also 
less likely to run for elections, and they represent a low percentage of seats in national 
parliaments (according to the InterParliamentary Union, in 2006 they represented 19.7% in 
the U.K., 18.5% in France, and 16.3% in the US).  
   In order to explain these gender differences economists have considered supply- and 
demand-side explanations.  Demand-side explanations focus on discrimination (see Altonji 
and Blank (1999) for a review of these theories, Neumark, Blank, and Van Nort (1996) or 
Goldin and Rouse (2000) for empirical evidence).  Supply-side explanations usually 
emphasize the role of women in the family and its impact on human capital investment and 
career choices (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Polachek, 1981).  A more recent literature 
analyzes if there are gender differences in competitiveness, investigating both the effect of 
gender on the productive efficiency of incentives and the effect of gender on the selection 
of competitive incentives.  Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) show that men, in 
contrast to women, perform better in competitive settings than when paid a piece rate. 
                                                
1 Goldin (1986), Brown (1990), Heywood, Siebert and Wei (1997), Heywood and Jirjahn (2002), and Jirjahn 
and Stephan (2004) provide current as well as historical evidence on the various reasons why females work 
wore often under piece-rate schemes: piece-rates were historically used as a substitute for monitoring and 
women had higher turnover/shorter expected tenure; piece-rates also respond to a higher need for 
flexibilityamong women due to family constraints; they lessen the possibility of discrimination because they 
are based on objective performance measurement. 
2 See, for example, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) and Blau, Simpson, and Anderson (1998).    
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Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) reveal a different tendency of men and women to choose 
to be rewarded based on relative performance rather than on the basis of one’s own 
performance only.  Women tend to shy away from competition.  The reasons behind these 
intriguing results are still poorly understood and they have inspired many other studies. In 
particular they lead us to investigate the sensitiveness of women’s competitiveness to the 
environment.  In our laboratory experiment, participants also have to choose between a 
piece rate and a tournament payment scheme before performing a task.  The novelty of our 
experiment is that we measure, conditional on a person’s own gender, the impact of gender 
matching on the person’s competitiveness.  Compared to Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), 
we can measure how beliefs regarding potential competitors’ choices influence  
individuals’ decisions. 
   There are several reasons why individuals in competitive situations may perceive other 
individuals’ gender to be relevant.  First, they may believe that the ability or payment 
scheme choices of men and women differ, which can lead them to condition behavior on 
other individuals’ gender.  Second, they may use their own and the other participant’s 
gender as a coordination device (see Knight 2002, and Holm 2000).  Third, some 
individuals may, regardless of beliefs about underlying fundamentals and gender-based 
conventions, have preferences that induce them to treat men and women differently.  Our 
experiment, while not designed to cleanly distinguish between these mutually non-
exclusive explanations, is designed to analyze in the laboratory whether information on the 
gender of a potential competitor influences the decision to compete or not.   
   An important experimental design choice was how to provide gender information.3 We 
began by employing an indirect procedure: Participants were given pseudonyms that 
                                                
3 Gender is typically revealed in experiments via visual contact (see, e.g., Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Eckel 
and Grossman, 2001, 2008; Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) or explicitly mentioned in 
the instructions (Holm, 2000; Slonim and Garbarino, 2007).  
 3 
corresponded to their gender, and they learned each other’s pseudonyms before making 
decisions, but it was not made common knowledge to participants in the instructions that a 
pseudonym was male (female) if and only if the person in question was a man (woman). 
We made this choice because we wished to avoid generating experimenter demand effects 
(subjects conclude that the experiment is about gender which can generate irrelevant or 
artificial effects).  Using this indirect approach, any finding that gender information 
mattered could be taken as being genuine and robust.  A potential problem with this 
procedure is that any non-significant findings about the role of other the participant’s 
gender can be attributed as much to the lack of common knowledge about the one-to-one 
mapping between pseudonyms and gender as to the absence of any genuine role played by 
knowing the other participant’s gender.  We therefore ran additional sessions where we 
used a more direct gender information revelation mechanism: Subjects were informed that 
pseudonyms represented gender.  We refer to these gender information revelation 
mechanisms as the Weak and Strong information procedures, respectively.  Our findings 
show that the behavior of men is sensitive to the procedure used.  
  Concerning the effects of the individual’s own gender, we find that in the Weak gender 
information procedure more than half of the men, but only a third of the women choose the 
tournament payment scheme.  The gender gap in competitiveness is 26 percentage points 
(20 points in the Strong information procedure).  This is comparable with the finding in 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).  In order to understand what causes this difference, we 
measure participants’ risk attitude and elicit their beliefs about other participants’ pay 
scheme choices and their performance, all conditioned on the others’ gender.4  These 
beliefs can matter, for if an individual believes that her co-player will choose the piece 
rate, then she should choose the tournament even if she believes the other is better at 
                                                
4 Men and women have been observed to differ in their degree of risk aversion (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; 
Charness and Gneezy, 2007; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). 
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performing the task.  We find that risk influences only women’s choices: the women who 
choose the tournament are significantly less risk-averse than those who choose the piece 
rate. In contrast, men are not influenced by their risk attitude.  Even after controlling for 
ability, beliefs and risk attitudes, men compete significantly more than women.   
 We observe a direct effect on behavior of knowing the other person’s gender, but only 
for men and only for the Strong information procedure.  Controlling for beliefs about the 
other person’s ability or expected choice, in this treatment men compete less when 
matched with a man than when matched with a woman.  This accords with the gender 
stereotypical convention found in Holm (2000).  This direct effect provides evidence that 
men, under the Strong procedure, are driven by gender-conditioned preferences similar to a 
preference-based taste for discrimination.  In contrast, women’s choices are not directly 
influenced by other participants’ gender.  Thus, we find only partial evidence that 
individuals’ own and others’ gender serve as an equilibrium selection device in our 
strategic situation.  Under the Weak information procedure there is no direct effect of other 
participants’ gender on choices.  
   Beliefs about other individuals’ degree of competitiveness vary with their gender and 
affect the individual’s own behavior.  The more men or women matched with a woman 
believe that women compete the more likely they are to choose the tournament themselves.  
Moreover, women compete less the more able they think both men and women are, while 
men are less likely to compete only when they are matched with a woman and they believe 
the women’s predicted ability is high.  Summarizing all the above, gender information 
affects the participant’s own behavior, but the magnitude of the effect and the channels 
through which it works (direct or via gender-conditioned beliefs) depend on the 
participant’s own gender and on the gender information procedure.  
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An important question is if participants made choices that (approximately) maximized 
their expected earnings given the empirical distribution of pay scheme and effort choices. 
Under the Weak gender information procedure, we find that men’s payment scheme 
choices are more optimal than women’s.  It is not the case that ‘men compete too much’. 
Rather, ‘women compete too little’.  Under the Strong information procedure the same 
results hold in encounters with women, but there are some differences in encounters with 
men.  Since under the Strong procedure men tend to compete less against men and more 
against women than under the Weak information procedure, we observe under the Strong 
procedure in encounters with men that more men suboptimally choose the piece rate, and 
more women optimally choose the piece rate.  
   Last, we study whether increasing the expected payoff of the tournament or allowing 
participants to choose their potential opponent’s gender before choosing their payment 
scheme reduce the gap in competitiveness.  We find that each of these changes increases 
women’s competitiveness, but they are not sufficient to close the gender gap in 
competitiveness. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related experimental 
literature.  Section 3 presents the game and gives some theoretical predictions.  Section 4 
describes the experimental design and Section 5 reports the results.  Section 6 considers the 
optimality of the observed choices.  Section 7 examines the impact on competitiveness of 
changing the structure of incentives or allowing individuals to choose the gender 
composition of their environment.  Section 8 concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) let participants perform a maze solving task under 
an exogenous piece rate or under an exogenous tournament payment scheme.  They find 
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that men solve significantly more mazes under the tournament than in the piece rate 
scheme, whereas the outputs of women are not significantly different.  Women work 
harder when placed in an all-female group compared to a mixed gender group.  Gneezy 
and Rustichini (2004), using a field experiment with school children racing against each 
other, obtained essentially the same result: boys perform better than girls when racing 
against someone else, but not when the children run alone.  Ivanova Stenzel and Kübler 
(2005) show that women perform best when competing in all-women teams against all-
men teams whereas men perform best in mixed teams. 
   Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) let participants choose between a piece rate and a 
tournament payment scheme.  They find a gender gap in tournament choice as women tend 
to shy away from competition (see also Vandegrift and Brown (2005), Vandegrift and 
Yavas (2009), Dohmen and Falk (2010)).  They show that this gender gap cannot be 
explained by differences in ability.  Moreover, although men are more overconfident than 
women about their relative ranking in the group, a large gender gap remains after 
controlling for these differences.  
   The recent literature has provided pieces of evidence mainly in favor of a cultural origin 
of these gender differences in competitiveness.  Gneezy et al. (2009) show that in 
matriarchal societies in India women are more likely to compete than men, whereas they 
found the opposite in patriarcal tribes in Tanzania.  The cultural explanation is also 
supported by Dreber et al. (2009) who cannot replicate the gender gap in competitiveness 
with children in Sweden, possibly because this society is more egalitarian than others, and 
by Booth and Nolan (2009) who find that girls from single-sex schools in the United 
Kingdom are more willing to compete than girls from co-educational schools.  In a recent 
study, Sutter and Rützler (2010) study the competitiveness of three to eighteen-year old 
children.  They find that the gender gap emerges early in life, from the age of five, but it is 
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not present in younger children.  This indicates the importance of social learning in the 
emergence of gender differences in competitiveness.  On the other hand, Wozniak et al. 
(2010) find that women who are in a low-hormone phase of the menstrual cycle are less 
likely to compete than those who are in the high-hormone phase of their cycle and the 
latter do not compete less than men.  However, the correlation between women in low 
hormone phase and women’s unwillingness to compete is not necessarily evidence of a 
biological origin of such gender differences in competitiveness if this result is partly driven 
by a stereotype threat induced by mestruation.  Overall, these studies focus on the role of 
gender, but they do not explore the potential influence of other individuals’ gender on the 
decision of an individual to compete or not to compete. 
   The relevance of other participants’ gender for economic decisions has been documented 
in other situations, such as bargaining (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 
2001; Sutter et al., 2009), in prisoner’s dilemma games (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965), 
and in coordination games (Holm, 2000).  These studies conclude that individuals 
condition their decisions on the gender of the persons they are interacting with.   There is, 
however, consensus neither on the direction of these effects nor on their origin. Some 
studies conclude that individuals are more aggressive when interacting with a woman, 
others point to a higher solidarity.  
   Gneezy et al. (2003) show that women perform better in a tournament when they are 
faced by women rather than by men.  By extension, another novel contribution of our 
paper is that we study if individuals’ competitiveness is affected when participants can 
choose whom to interact with.  Economists have paid little attention to the impact of 
gender-based partner selection on decision-making.  An exception is Slonim and Garbarino 
(2007).  They find that partner selection affects subsequent actions by increasing trust and 
altruism in a trust and a dictator game.  In an investment game, Slonim (2006) finds that 
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participants select and invest more in partners of the opposite gender.  Using data on co-
authorship patterns in top economic journals, Boschini and Sjögren (2007) show that 
women are twice as likely as men to co-author with women.  We contribute to this 
literature by considering if and how partner selection affects men’s and women's payment 
scheme choices.  
3. THEORY 
3.1. The game  
Participants are randomly matched in pairs, and each receives information about the 
other’s gender.  Each participant then simultaneously chooses either a piece rate payment 
scheme or a tournament scheme.  Each individual is informed about her co-participant’s 
payment scheme choice, and they then perform a maze solving task.  
Payoffs. If an individual chooses the piece rate payment scheme, she is paid 4 points for 
every maze she solves (1 point = 0.25 Euro), regardless of the co-participant’s payment 
scheme choice.  If she chooses the tournament, one of two cases occurs:  
• If the co-participant also chooses the tournament, the player who produces most mazes 
gets 6 points for every maze solved.  The other participant gets 1 point for every maze 
solved.  In case of a tie, the winner is randomly selected.  
• If the co-participant chooses the piece rate, the participant who chose the tournament gets 
6 points for every maze she solves.  
In other words, if a participant is the only one who chose the tournament payment scheme, 
he automatically receives the high payment per solved maze.  Note also that our payments 
are not fixed prizes, but payments per unit of output, as in Gneezy et al. (2003) and 
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Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).5 After the participants have solved mazes for fifteen 
minutes, each is informed about the number of mazes she has solved and about her payoff, 
if they won or lost, but he or she does not learn how many mazes the co-participant solved.  
3.2. Theoretical predictions 
We assume that individuals seek to maximize expected money earnings.  We consider risk 
aversion below.  We also assume that there are no effects of the chosen scheme on output, 
that a player knows his own ability, and knows the ability distribution of men and women.  
Consider, say, a man who can produce qi mazes and who is matched with a woman.  The 
man’s optimal choice between the piece rate or the tournament depends on his beliefs 
about the woman’s payment scheme choice and on how much output she is expected to be 
able to produce.  Formally, let j=1,2,…,n index the female abilities (maze outputs).  Let pj 
denote the probability that the woman’s ability level is qj, and let pjT denote the probability 
that a woman of ability qj chooses the tournament.  The man’s payoff from choosing the 
piece rate is 4qi.  If he chooses the tournament, his expected payoff can be written as:  
pj
j=1
n
! 6qi (1" pjT ) + # ij p jT$% &' ,  
                  
where πij is the man’s expected payoff from choosing the tournament when matched with a 
woman of ability qj who also chose the tournament.  We have πij=6qi if qi>qj (the man 
wins the tournament), πij=3.5qi if qi=qj (a tie), and πij=qi if qi<qj (the man loses the 
tournament).  The first term inside the square bracket is the expected gain from being 
                                                
5 There are, however, several differences between our game and that in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). In 
our experiment a participant who chooses the tournament wins if he produces more than the co-participant 
who also chose the tournament, and a participant wins by default if he is the only one to choose the 
tournament. In Niederle and Vesterlund’s experiment, on the other hand, the performance of someone who 
chooses the tournament is compared with a ‘baseline’ performance of all participants, including those who 
did not choose the tournament, and several people can win the competition. Moreover, whereas in Niederle 
and Vesterlund beliefs about other participants’ pay scheme choices play no role, in our experiment these 
beliefs can affect decisions. Indeed, in a real setting we expect that people condition their decision to 
compete on their beliefs regarding the competitiveness of others. 
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matched with a woman of ability qj who chooses the piece rate; in this case the man, by 
virtue of being the only one who chose the tournament, gets the high payment, 6, per maze. 
The second term is the expected gain when the woman chooses the tournament.  
   The tournament is an optimal choice for the man matched with a woman of ability qj if 
the man believes he is better than the woman.  But the tournament is optimal even when 
the man believes he is worse than the woman, if the man believes the woman is sufficiently 
unlikely to choose the tournament (pjT is sufficiently small).  Overall, we see that: i) a 
higher (believed) own ability, and so equivalently a higher own believed relative ability 
relative to the female abilities, (weakly) raises the expected payoff from the tournament, 
and so (weakly) increases the likelihood that the tournament payment scheme is optimal; 
ii) the lower the overall proportion of women who are thought to choose the tournament, 
the higher is the expected payoff from the tournament payment scheme.  Risk aversion 
makes the safe piece rate option relatively more attractive.  Ceteris paribus, we should 
therefore expect that more risk-averse participants are less likely to choose the tournament.  
   In our experiment, participants must form beliefs about the proportions of men and 
women of different abilities they think will choose the tournament (the pjT numbers, see 
equation 1).  In equilibrium, all participants make correct estimates about others’ payment 
schemes and all choose the optimal payment scheme.  We felt it would be a cognitively 
very demanding task to ask participants to estimate the two ability distributions and, for 
each possible ability level, to estimate the proportion of participants of that ability level 
who would choose the tournament.  We chose instead to estimate beliefs about men and 
women’s ability in a simpler way, namely by asking participants to estimate the average 
performance of men and of women (see below).  
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4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
4.1 The task  
As Gneezy et al. (2003) we use mazes similar to those available at 
http://games.yahoo.com/games/maze.html.  All have same level of difficulty. Participants 
receive the same mazes in the same order and this is common knowledge.  On the 
computer screen, a marker indicates the current position in the maze and it is possible to 
restart from any point already reached.  Participants could at any time abandon the current 
maze and move on to a new maze by clicking the ‘next’ button.  The screen also indicates 
the number of mazes already solved and the time elapsed.  Before being informed about 
the rules of the game, participants practice by solving three mazes.  
4.2 Providing gender information.  
At the beginning of the session the participants complete a demographic questionnaire 
containing a gender question, and the computer then allocates each participant a 
pseudonym6 that corresponds to his or her own gender.  
The Weak gender information procedure 
After two individuals are randomly paired, each participant is informed about the co-
participant’s pseudonym, but subjects are not explicitly informed that male (female) 
pesudonyms are only given to men (women).  We use this procedure to preserve 
anonymity and to minimize biases, such as participants changing their behavior just 
because of a demand effect.  A subject was, however, not explicitly told in the instructions 
                                                
6 The pseudonyms correspond to the ten most popular names for each gender in 2003 (RNIPP and INSEE).  
For females the names are: Chloe, Clara, Emma, Aurelia, Lea, Manon, Marie, Océane, Sarah, and Carla. For 
males the names: Alexandre, Antoine, Clement, Enzo, Hugo, Lucas, Maxime, Quentin, Theo, and Thomas. A 
similar procedure is used in psychology (see Ingram and Berger, 1977). These names are typically either 
male or female and there is no ambiguity on the gender associated with any name. They are not known to 
convey any specific message on the competitiveness of their owner. The participants did not choose their 
pseudonym and they were not informed on the full list of names. 
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that a pseudonym always reflected the person’s gender, and this was therefore not common 
knowledge.  We cannot exclude the possibility that participants might disregard gender 
information because they were not certain that the co-participant’s pseudonym 
corresponded to his/her actual gender, or because they may have worried that the other 
participant had such doubt. To deal with these concerns, we also used a stronger procedure.   
The Strong gender information procedure 
We ran two additional sessions where it was made explicit that participants’ pseudonyms 
reflected their gender.  Precisely, the instructions stated that “If you are a woman, your 
pseudonym is a female name, and if you are a man your pseudonym is a male name. 
Similarly, if your co-participant is a man, his pseudonym will be a male name, and if your 
co-participant is a woman, her pseudonym will be a female name.” 
4.3 Measuring risk attitudes and eliciting beliefs 
Risk attitudes. Risk aversion can influence the decision to choose the tournament payment 
scheme.7  To measure risk attitudes, we use a modified version of the psychometric test in 
Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002).  In a post-experimental questionnaire (see online 
Supplementary Material, SM2), participants rate the likelihood that they would engage in 
sixteen domain-specific risky activities on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (”extremely 
unlikely”) to 5 (”extremely likely”).  A participant’s risk attitude score is computed by 
summing up her answers to these sixteen items. The higher the score, the more risk-loving 
the participant is.8   
                                                
7 Women have been found to be more risk-averse than men in financial decision-making (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2001, Powell and Ansic, 1997; Barsky et al., 1997; Borghans et al. 2009; they invest less 
(Charness and Gneezy, 2007) or more conservatively (Jianokoplos and Bernasek, 1998). See Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) for a survey. 
8 We did not use lottery choices. A psychometric scale is a more neutral elicitation method in the context of 
our game. Compared to the traditional lottery elicitation procedures, this method seems to give more stable 
results (Eckel, 2005). In addition, organizing the lottery before starting the game would have focused 
attention on the risk associated with the tournament choice and could have biased behavior. Organizing it at 
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Measuring beliefs about ability. Any gender difference in the choice of the tournament 
could be due to men and women differing in beliefs about relative ability.9  After 
performing the task and receiving feedback on earnings, participants estimate the average 
performance of men and of women in their session.  For simplicity they are asked to do 
this unconditional on the payment scheme chosen. Each accurate answer pays €1.10   
Measuring beliefs about payment scheme choices. After having performed the task and 
received a feedback on own payoff, and after being informed of the numbers of men and 
women participating in the session, each participant is asked to predict the number of men 
and the number of women in the session who chose the tournament.  Each correct answer 
is paid €1.  This data allows us to see whether men and women differ in their beliefs about 
men’s and women’s payment scheme choices, to see how accurate these beliefs are, and to 
see if these beliefs influenced people’s own choices.11  In addition, in our last four 
sessions, after making his own decision, but before being informed of the actual choice of 
his co-participant, each participant has to predict the decision of his co-participant to enter 
or not the competition.  This gives us an additional information on the subject’s belief at 
the time of making his decision.  The accuracy of this prediction is also rewarded (€1). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
the end of the session would have introduced a risk that subjects’ choices in the lottery were conditioned on 
the risk already taken during the game. In contrast, our questionnaire was based on reported risk behavior in 
various domains and we assume that the answers were not conditioned on the decisions in the game. 
9 Overconfidence can give excess entry in competition (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). Exaggerating their 
control over events, a majority of individuals is unreasonably optimistic about the future (Taylor and Brown, 
1988). They overestimate the precision of their knowledge (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). They believe their 
performance is above the median (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). Also, men have been shown to be more 
overconfident than women in investment decisions (Barber and Odean, 2001).  
10 An alternative procedure would have been to ask the participants to assess their chances of winning the 
tournament. We did not use this procedure because we sought to collect more detailed data on predicted 
performance of men and women to measure the potential importance of gender stereotypes. We discuss our 
elicitation procedure further in Section 5.3. 
11 Previous research has shown that people can suffer from “competitive blind spots” (i.e., a tendency to 
underestimate the competitiveness of the environment (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999).  
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4.4 Logistics 
The experiment was conducted at the GATE laboratory (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie 
Economique) in Lyon, France, using the REGATE software (Zeiliger, 2000).  In total 280 
undergraduates studying at business or engineering schools (139 men and 141 women) 
participated in 14 sessions (see Appendix 1). 12 (2) sessions used the Weak (Strong) 
gender information procedure.  Each session involved 20 participants, with at least 9 
participants of the same gender.  57 mixed pairs, 46 female pairs, and 37 male pairs were 
matched.  The main treatment involved 70 women and 70 men.   
   Upon arrival, the participants were randomly assigned to a computer. They answered a 
computerized demographic survey.  The first part of the instructions (see online 
Supplementary Material, SM1), describing the nature of the task, was distributed and read 
aloud, and participants then practiced by solving three mazes.  The second part of the 
instructions was then distributed and read aloud.  The participants filled out a questionnaire 
in order to check their understanding and any questions were answered in private.  Each 
participant then received a pseudonym, was randomly matched with another participant, 
and learned the co-participant’s pseudonym.  Participants chose their payment scheme and 
received feedback on their co-participant’s decision.  Then participants performed the task 
for 15 minutes. They were then informed about their earnings, but not about the co-
participant’s performance or earnings.  We elicited their beliefs regarding the choice and 
performance of men and women in the session. Finally, participants reported their risk 
behaviors.  
   On average a session lasted 70 minutes.  The participants were paid at the rate 1 point = 
0.25 Euro.  In addition, they were paid a show-up fee of €2, plus €2 for the questionnaire 
on risk attitudes, and up to €5 for accurate predictions.  On average, women earned €16.90 
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(SD 5.82) and men €19.08 (SD 7.92).  The payments were made in cash in a separate 
room.  
5. RESULTS 
Tables 1a and 1b present descriptive statistics for the payment scheme choices and average 
number of mazes solved, for each gender and conditional on the gender of the co-
participant.  Table 1a (1b) is about the Weak (Strong) gender information procedure.  
(Table 1 about here) 
5.1 The gender gap in competition and the influence of the co-participant’s gender 
Tables 1a and 1b show a large gender gap in payment scheme choices: using the Weak 
gender information procedure, 34% of women and 60% of men enter the tournament; using 
the Strong information procedure, the respective percentages are 25% and 45%.  In both 
treatments, the percentage of women choosing the tournament is significantly lower than 
the 50% that would have been expected if choices were random (binomial tests: p = 0.032 
under the Weak information procedure and p = 0.041 under the Strong information 
procedure, two-sided).  In contrast, the corresponding percentages of men are not 
significantly different from 50% (binomial tests: p = 0.203 under the Weak procedure and 
p = 0.823 under the Strong procedure, two-sided).  
Overall, there is no significant difference in the choice of tournament between the Weak 
and the Strong conditions, both for women (M-W: p = 0.467) and for men (p = 0.257).  
This allows us to pool the data from both conditions.  Overall, the gender gap is 
statistically significant (χ2 test: p = 0.004; two-sided Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.006).   
    As regards the impact of gender matching under the Weak information procedure, Table 
1a indicates that 34.37% of women choose the tournament payment scheme when matched 
with another woman, and 33.33% of women do the same when matched with a man.  The 
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difference is not significant (χ2 test: p = 0.941; two-sided Fisher’s exact test: p = 1.000).   
In this condition, 55.56% of men choose the tournament when matched with a woman and 
62.50% of men make the same choice when matched with a man; the difference is not 
significant either (χ2 test: p = 0.630; two-sided Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.765).  Turning to 
the Strong gender information procedure, Table 1b indicates that 25% of women choose 
the tournament payment scheme both when matched with another woman or with a man, 
while 62.50% of men make the same choice when matched with a woman and 33.33% 
when matched with another man.   Although the proportion of men entering the 
competition is twice as high when matched with a woman than with a man, the difference 
is not statistically significant (χ2 test: p = 0.199, two-sided Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.362).   
Mann-Whitney tests (M-W thereafter) comparing the choice of the payment scheme in 
the Weak and the Strong information conditions for each gender and each gender matching 
configuration indicate no significant differences, except when considering the choice of the 
tournament by men who are matched with another man (p = 0.087).12   We next turn to an 
econometric analysis of the data to identify the determinants of competitive choices. 
5.2 Explaining the gender gap in tournament choice 
We estimate four probit models to identify the determinants of the probability to choose 
the tournament.  The first two probit models are estimated on the pooled sample of men 
and women, in order to measure the overall impact of gender and gender matching on pay 
scheme choices.  In model (1) we introduce the separate effects of the participant's and the 
co-participant's gender on tournament choice, while in model (2) we allow for the 
interaction of own gender and partner’s gender by including all possible gender 
configurations of the pairs, with the woman-man pairs as the reference.  Model (2) is also 
                                                
12 The p-value is equal to 0.746 for men matched with a woman, 0.677 for women matched with a man, and 
0.557 for women matched with another woman. 
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estimated on each sub-sample separately to test whether some variables have a different 
impact on men and women (model (3) is for the sub-sample of women and model (4) is for 
the sub-sample of men). In models (3) and (4), the reference category is the mixed pairs.  
In the four models we have pooled the data from the Weak and the Strong gender 
information procedures and we have included a dummy variable indicating the Strong 
gender information procedure.  This variable is interacted with both the subject’s gender 
variable and the co-participant’s gender variable.   
   In all models, we include as an explanatory variable the participant’s risk score; the 
higher the score, the less risk-averse the participant.  In the first two models this score is 
interacted with the participant's gender to allow for a different impact of risk score by 
gender on the choice of the tournament.  Also included is the participant’s belief about the 
proportion of men (women) choosing the tournament (excluding him or herself) if paired 
with a man (woman), and his or her beliefs about the average maze output of men (women) 
(excluding him or herself) if paired with a man (woman).  A participant should be more 
likely to choose the tournament the less likely he thinks that his co-participant will choose 
the tournament.  Similarly, he should be more likely to enter the tournament the less able 
he thinks that his co-participant is.  We add the participant’s actual performance as a 
control for own ability.  We make two assumptions when doing so.  First, we assume that 
effort is the same in both payment schemes and that differences in performance under the 
piece rate and the tournament result from the self-selection of participants with various 
abilities.13  Second, we assume that the participants are aware of their own ability.  Lastly, 
we control for the participant's age and his or her experience with economic experiments. 
These regressions test whether any gender effect remains when we control for both own 
                                                
13 Participants have an incentive to provide the maximum level of effort whatever the payment scheme 
chosen since they are always paid as a function of the number of mazes solved. 
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characteristics and beliefs about others conditional on the co-participant’s gender.  Table 2 
displays the results of these regressions (mean values in Appendix 3). 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
 
Gender.  Model (1) in Table 2 shows that in both models, when we control for risk attitude, 
ability, and beliefs, men choose the tournament significantly more (at the 1% level) than 
women, whatever their co-participant’s gender.  Model (2) indicates that, compared to 
women matched with a man (the reference category), both men matched with a man and 
men matched with a woman (especially under the Strong gender information procedure) 
are significantly more likely to choose the tournament.  Also, women matched with a 
woman do not compete more than when matched with a man.  
   We also find that men’s probability of choosing the tournament is directly influenced by 
their co-participant’s gender when the information on gender is provided via the Strong 
gender information procedure.  More precisely, men matched with men compete 
significantly less under the Strong than the Weak information procedure (see models (1) 
and (4)).  Since in both models we control for risk attitude, ability and beliefs, these 
findings indicate that men’s decisions are conditioned by their opponent’s gender when the 
gender information is provided in a sufficiently salient manner.  This is consistent with the 
results from the non-parametric tests.14  
Risk attitude.  Table 2 shows that risk attitudes influence the payment scheme choices of 
women, but not of men.  Women are more likely to choose the tournament the higher is 
their risk score and this is highly significant (see model (3)).  The decision of men is, 
however, not affected by their risk attitude (see model (4)).  Considering the raw data from 
                                                
14 Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the same number of women matched with a man choose the tournament 
under the Strong and the Weak information procedure (p = 0.677); they reach the same conclusion for both 
women (p = 0.557) and men (p = 0.756) when paired with a woman. In contrast, when paired with another 
man, less men choose the tournament when information on gender is more salient (p = 0.087).  
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both Weak and Strong information procedures (see the score distributions in Appendix 2), 
we find that the average risk score is higher for men (mean = 49.36, S.D. = 6.45) than for 
women (mean = 48.33, S.D. = 6.80).  The difference is, however, not significant according 
to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions (p = 0.826, exact). The 
women who compete are significantly less risk-averse than the non-competing women 
(means = 50.86 and 47.17 respectively, S.D. = 7.99 and 5.90; Kolmogorov Smirnov test: p 
= 0.066, exact). In contrast, the men who choose the tournament are not less risk-averse 
than those who choose the piece rate (mean = 49.87 and 48.71, respectively, S.D. = 6.59 
and 6.30; Kolmogorov Smirnov test: p = 0.759, exact).  Variations in risk preference thus 
explain variations in women’s choices, but not men’s.15 
Beliefs about others’ payment scheme choices.  In both models an expectation of higher 
female competitiveness (the "predicted entry rate of women if female co-participant" 
variable) significantly increases the likelihood of choosing the tournament payment 
scheme for both men and women.  Only women are influenced, but marginally so, by their 
beliefs regarding men’s competitiveness.  These results are surprising because according to 
the model outlined in Section 3.2 a participant should be more likely to choose the 
tournament the more he or she believes that the co-participant will stay out of the 
competition.  One possible explanation is that participants feel it is normatively less 
acceptable to shy away from competing against a woman when one believes that women 
will compete.  Pooling data from both the Weak and Strong information procedures, 
descriptive statistics indicate that 91.43% of women and 88.57% of men believe that the 
percentage of men choosing the tournament is higher than the percentage of women 
making the same choice (M-W: p = 0.575, two-tailed).  On average women and men have 
the same beliefs about women’s likelihood of choosing the tournament payment scheme 
                                                
15  If our risk attitude elicitation method underestimated gender differences compared to lottery choices, we 
should expect that this difference in choices conditional on the risk score would be even larger. 
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(42.46% and 39.36%, respectively; M-W: p = 0.139), but women predict a marginally 
higher competitiveness of men than men themselves (66.94% and 61.00%, respectively; p 
= 0.083).  These beliefs are quite accurate.  The differences in men’s and women’s beliefs 
are, however, too small to explain the gender gap in competition.  
Beliefs about abilities.  Beliefs about others’ ability receive the predicted negative sign and 
this variable is significant at the 1% level in both models.  Regressions on the gender sub-
samples show, however, that these beliefs mainly influence women’s decisions, while men 
only react to the predicted average ability of women when paired with a woman, and only 
marginally so.  The raw data show that on average women believe that men solved 11.52 
mazes (S.D. = 3.05) and other women solved 9.93 mazes (S.D. = 2.85, Wilcoxon test: 
p<0.001); men believe that other men solved 11.73 mazes (S.D. = 2.70) and women solved 
10.15 mazes (S.D. = 2.52, Wilcoxon test:  p<0.001).  Average male and female predictions 
about men’s and women’s ability are thus similar (M-W: p = 0.250 and p = 0.390, 
respectively).  In addition, 93.33% of women and 95% of men expect men to be more able 
than women (M-W: p = 0.698).  However, men only avoid competing against women but 
not against men when they expect the latter to be very able, as if taking the risk of losing 
against an abler woman was bringing additional disutility.16     
   Table 2 also indicates that, controlling for the other variables, more able participants 
from both genders are significantly more likely to choose the tournament, at the 1% level.  
Descriptive statistics indicate that those men who chose the tournament payment scheme 
solved more mazes (12.50 in a two-person tournament and 14.29 in a single-person 
tournament) than those who chose the piece rate payment scheme (12.13), whereas for 
                                                
16 We found no correlation between the beliefs about entry decisions and those about ability (p = 0.869 when 
the co-participant is a man and p = 0.787 when she is a woman).  This indicates that the participants make a 
clear distinction between these dimensions. The same regressions as those reported in Table 2 have also been 
tested without including beliefs about the entry decisions. For women, the opponent’s predicted ability still 
matters whatever the gender of the opponent.  For men, the opponent’s predicted ability remains 
insignificant. 
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women the difference is smaller (11.44 in a two-person tournament, 10.46 in a single-
person tournament, and 11.10 in the piece rate scheme).  Tables 1a and 1b give the 
corresponding numbers for the Weak and the Strong information procedures separately. 
Summarizing the above, we find that own gender remains a significant determinant of 
the decision to compete even after controlling for risk attitude, beliefs and ability.17  Also, 
the co-participant’s gender matters directly for men when the information on gender is 
provided via the Strong gender information procedure, and indirectly through beliefs 
mainly about women’s competitiveness and ability.18 
6. THE OPTIMALITY OF PAYMENT SCHEME CHOICES 
 
The optimal pay scheme choice for a participant is the one that, given the empirical 
distribution of pay scheme choices and outputs, maximizes the person’s expected earnings. 
In what follows we ignore the unmeasured subjective cost of performing the task and 
assume people are risk-neutral.  Moreover, we assume that a participant would produce the 
same number of mazes in the non-chosen payment scheme as in the chosen payment 
scheme.  This reflects our previous assumption that a participant’s output is a good 
measure of his inherent ability.  
                                                
17 When estimating model 1 with only gender, partner’s gender, ability, age, experience, and the Strong 
information procedure, the pseudo R2 is 0.081. Adding the risk and risk*man variables raises the pseudo R2 
to 0.111. Adding beliefs about the co-participant’s gender entry rate raises it to 0.130. After adding beliefs 
about others’ ability, the pseudo R2 reaches 0.204. This confirms the importance of each of these dimensions.  
18 The beliefs about entry decisions are measured after participants were informed of their co-player’s 
choice.  We have checked that this procedure has not influenced reported beliefs. Mann-Whitney tests 
indicate that neither women nor men’s beliefs on entry rates by gender are influenced by their co-
participant’s actual decision. Furthermore, in four sessions participants stated their beliefs about their co-
participant’s choice after they had made their own choice, but before they learned the co-participant’s choice.  
We found that expecting the co-participant entering the competition increases (and not decreases) the 
individual’s likelihood of competing, especially if the co-participant is a woman. Eliciting beliefs about their 
co-participant’s payment scheme choice before or after they learned the co-participant’s choice leads to the 
same qualitative analysis. Regarding beliefs about ability, a potential bias could arise from the fact that a 
participant states his belief after being informed on whether he won or lost the tournament in case both 
players competed. Mann-Whitney tests show that being informed about one’s success or failure does not 
impact the predictions. Also, there is no significant difference in beliefs between the winners and the losers 
of the two-person tournaments. We thus believe that there is no noticeable bias in the way we elicited beliefs. 
Details are available in the online Supplementary Material, SM3. 
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   In order to compute the expected payoff an individual would earn from choosing the 
piece rate instead of the tournament, we simply multiply his tournament output by the 
piece rate.  To compute what expected payoff a participant would earn from having chosen 
the tournament instead of the piece rate, we keep the gender configuration fixed and 
compare the participant’s output with the relevant reference group.  As an example, 
consider a woman who was matched with a man and who chose the piece rate.  We 
compute her expected payoff from choosing the tournament by randomly matching her 
with one of the men who were matched with a woman and who either i) chose the piece 
rate or ii) who chose the tournament and whose female opponent also chose the 
tournament.  The expected payoff from choosing the tournament is a weighted average of 
these payoffs.19      
Table 3 shows, for each of the four gender configurations, the proportion of participants 
for whom the actually chosen pay scheme was optimal. 
(Table 3 about here) 
Consider first the Weak gender information procedure. Among the women who were 
matched with men and who chose the piece rate, only 16.66% did so optimally.  But in the 
same encounters the tournament was optimal for 83.33% of the women who chose this pay 
scheme.  All the women who were matched with other women and who chose the piece 
rate should have competed instead, and all the women who competed did so optimally. 
This shows that women compete too little: most would have been better off by choosing 
                                                
19 More precisely, suppose the woman’s piece rate output is qi. Let p denote the empirical proportion of men 
who were matched with women and who chose the tournament. Let ! FM
TT  denote the expected payoff to a 
female of ability qi from being matched with a man when both chose the tournament: ! FM
TT
= pj
j
" ! ij , where 
the summation is over all the outputs of males matched with females where both chose the tournament, pj is 
the relative frequency of these outputs, and πij is the tournament payoff from matching output qi with output 
qj. The expected payoff from choosing the tournament is then computed as 6qi (1 ! p) + " FMTT p . If this payoff 
exceeds the woman’s observed piece rate payoff, 4qi, we conclude that she made a sub-optimal payment 
scheme choice. Otherwise her payment scheme choice is optimal. 
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the tournament instead of the piece rate.  Although all the women who were matched with 
a woman should have chosen the tournament, only 34.38% of them did so.  
   We also see from Table 3 that, when matched with a woman, the tournament is optimal 
regardless of the participant’s own gender.  This is true even for participants with very low 
productivity.  The reason is that since only 34% of the women choose the tournament, a 
participant who is matched with a woman will profit from choosing the tournament simply 
because he or she is likely to be the only one who chose to compete.  
  Compared with women, men behave significantly more optimally. Like women, all the 
men who in encounters with women chose the piece rate, all did so incorrectly, and like 
women all the men who in encounters with women chose the tournament did so correctly. 
But among the men who were matched with men and who chose the piece rate, 58.33% did 
so optimally, while the number for women is only 16.66%.  And while 90% of the men 
who in encounters with men chose the tournament optimally, for women the number is 
only 83.33%.  Combining Table 3 with Table 1a, we find that, overall, 78.12% (55.56%) of 
men paired with another man (woman) made the appropriate choice.  In contrast, only 
38.89% (34.38%) of women paired with a man (woman) chose the best payment scheme. 
On average men earn 24.20% more than women.  
   Consider now the Strong gender information procedure.  In encounters with women the   
optimality of the observed choices is the same as for the Weak information procedure: 
Women are so unlikely to compete that any person, whether man or women, and regardless 
of her actual ability, should choose the tournament if matched with a woman.  The main 
difference from the Weak information procedure lies in encounters with men. Since men 
matched with men (women) are less (more) likely to compete under the Strong than the 
Weak gender information procedure, all the men who chose the piece rate should have 
chosen the tournament, and all the men who chose the tournament did so optimally; for 
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women the piece rate pay scheme becomes correspondingly more optimal.  Here, on 
average men earn 13.82% more than women. 
   How much could those who made sub-optimal choices expect to gain from switching 
payment scheme?  We consider the Weak information procedure and randomly select from 
each of the four gender configurations a participant from the pool who made a suboptimal 
payment scheme and compute his or her expected gain from switching to the optimal 
payment scheme, while keeping all other participants’ choices fixed.20  Table 4 shows the 
average expected gains for each procedure.  
(Table 4 about here) 
Under the Weak information procedure, when matched with a woman, the women (men) 
who incorrectly chose the piece rate could on average gain 35.8% (30.8%) more from 
switching to the tournament.  Against men, both women and men stand to gain 
considerable increases in earnings from switching payment scheme.  The numbers for the 
Strong information procedure are qualitatively similar.  When matched with a woman, the 
tournament was never suboptimally chosen, even by low ability individuals.  The 
difference from the Weak information procedure is that the same is now true when men are 
matched with male opponents.  The reason is again that men are less competitive in these 
encounters than under the Weak information procedure. 
7. CAN ONE INCREASE WOMEN’S COMPETITIVENESS? 
Which policies can increase women's competitiveness and decrease the gap in 
competitiveness?  We first investigate the impact of increasing the monetary incentives 
offered by tournaments.  We then increase the participants’ control over their environment 
by letting them choose their co-participant’s gender.  
                                                
20 In computing these numbers, we have ignored the fact that moving a participant from the sub-optimal to 
the optimal payment scheme affects the overall distributions of payment scheme choices, and hence affects 
the expected payoffs of other participants.  
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7.1 Increasing the monetary incentives to compete  
In our Incentive treatment we change the payoffs.  In three new sessions, involving 30 
women and 30 men, the loser’s payment was increased from 1 to 1.5 points per maze and 
the piece rate payment was reduced from 4 to 3 points per maze.  The winner’s payment 
remains the same (6 points per maze).  This is the only difference from the Baseline 
treatment with the Weak gender information procedure.   Figure 1 displays the percentage 
of individuals choosing the tournament for each gender configuration in this treatment 
compared to the Baseline.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
The percentage of women choosing the tournament is now 63.33%, whereas before it was 
34% and the difference is significant (M-W: p = 0.011); the increase is similar whatever 
the co-participant’s gender.  But men are also more competitive when tournament 
incentives are increased, especially when matched with a woman.  The percentage of men 
choosing the tournament increases from 60% to 93.33% (M-W: p = 0.001).  Therefore the 
gender gap in competitiveness increases to 30% while it was equal to 24.28% in the 
Baseline and it remains significant (χ2 test: p = 0.005; Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.010, two-
sided).  This shows that women respond to changes in the monetary incentives (it is not the 
case that women ‘just don’t like to compete’), but this does not reduce the gap in 
competitiveness whatever the co-participant’s gender.  
7.2 Allowing participants to choose their co-participant 
To see the gender matching preferences and their impact on the gap in competitiveness, we 
run an additional treatment, Partner Choice, where individuals choose to interact with a 
man or a woman  after being informed on the rules of the game, but before choosing their 
payment scheme.  Four additional sessions involved 41 women and 39 men.  Each 
participant saw on the screen a female and a male pseudonym, each referring to another 
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participant in the room.  The participant then chose one of these participants to be his or 
her co-participant.21  All other features of the experiment remained the same as in the 
Baseline under the Weak gender information procedure.  
   In comparison with the Baseline treatment under the Weak gender information 
procedure, women but not men are more likely to choose the tournament.  The overall 
percentage of women who choose the tournament increases from 34% to 53.66% 
(+57.82%; M-W:  p = 0.068), while the percentage of men increases from 60% to 74.36%, 
but not significantly so (+23.93%; M-W: p = 0.157).  Giving participants more control 
over their environment reduces the gender gap in tournament choice from 26 (25 if one 
includes the data from the Strong procedure) percentage points in the Baseline treatment to 
20.70 percentage points in the new treatment (a Mann-Whitney test indicates, however, 
that the difference is not significant, p = 0.570, N=11).  The choice of the tournament 
remains, however, significantly different for men and women  (χ2 test: p = 0.054; Fisher’s 
exact test: p = 0.066, two-sided).  
   Considering participants’ partner choices, 68.29% of women and 71.78% of men choose 
to be paired with a woman (the difference is not significant; (χ2 test: p = 0.733, Fisher’s 
exact test, p = 0.810, two-sided).  Both percentages are significantly different from a 
random choice (binomial tests: p = 0.027 for women and p = 0.009 for men).22  This makes 
sense for participants who plan to compete since a large majority of participants believe 
that women are less able and less willing to choose the tournament.  This cannot be the 
only motivation since the impact of the choice of a female co-participant on 
competitiveness is only significant for women.  Indeed, of the women who choose to be 
                                                
21 A participant is always matched with the person he chose. To see how the matching works, suppose that 
participant X chooses Y, that Y chooses Z, and that they all choose the tournament. Participant X’s 
performance is then compared with Y’s. Y is not informed about him/her being chosen by X, and Y’s payoff 
only depends on the comparison between Y and Z. 
22 These percentages also indicate that the participants considered the pseudonyms as corresponding to the 
actual gender even in the Weak information procedure; otherwise they would have been indifferent. 
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matched with another woman, 57.14% select the tournament, while only 34.38% of the 
women who were exogenously matched with a woman made the same decision (M-W: p = 
0.079).  Those women who chose to be matched with a man choose the tournament more 
often than in the Baseline (46.15% vs. 33.33%), but not significantly so (p = 0.477). Of the 
men who choose to be matched with a woman, 75% select the tournament (55.56% in the 
Baseline; M-W: p = 0.175); those who chose to be matched with another man choose the 
tournament more often than in the Baseline (72.73% versus 62.50%), but not significantly 
so either (p = 0.544) (see also Figure 1).23 
Being able to decide whether to work with women rather than men has a stimulating 
effect on women’s competitiveness.  This increase in competitiveness cannot be explained 
by women believing they have a larger chance of winning the competition against a 
woman than against a man.  Indeed, similar regressions than those reported in Table 2 
conducted on this treatment only (not reported but available upon request) reveal that the 
more women believe that women are able on average, the more they choose the 
tournament (p = 0.096).  Even in this treatment, the gender of the co-participant does not 
influence the selection of the tournament (p = 0.675 for women and p = 0.823 for men).  A 
more plausible explanation of the higher competitiveness of women in this treatment is that 
women tend to be more sensitive to the social context in which they make choices. Having 
better control over this environment, through the choice of the co-participant’s gender, 
improves their competitiveness.  Indeed, as reported in Croson and Gneezy (2009), women 
would be more sensitive to the social context than men.  
Overall, the two policies we have investigated increase women’s competitiveness but they 
are not able to reduce the gap in competitiveness.  
 
                                                
23 The conclusions are similar if we pool the data from the Weak and the Strong information procedures. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) found that men are more competitive than women. We 
extend their investigation by asking if these differential competitive tendencies interact 
with the gender composition of the group.  We also find that individuals’ own gender 
matters, after controlling for ability, risk attitudes and beliefs about others’ ability and 
competitiveness.  Women but not men are influenced by the riskiness of the tournament, 
and beliefs about other’s ability influence the decision to enter a tournament.  We measure 
the extent to which gender information affects behavior indirectly, through gender-
conditioned beliefs about others’ ability and pay scheme choices, and whether there is a 
direct effect on behavior of knowing others’ gender, possibly due to the presence of a 
preference for discriminating between men and women, or due to commonly held gender-
conditioned beliefs about others’ behavior (Holm, 2000).  We find that the strength of the 
direct effect depends on the exact way the gender information is provided.  When using the 
Strong gender information procedure, men compete more when matched with women than 
with men.  There is, however, no analogous result for women.  The direct effect seems to 
be based on a preference-based taste for discrimination among men rather than the people 
using gender as a coordination device.  When we use a weaker procedure to provide gender 
information, there is no direct effect.  Turning to indirect effects, we find that the beliefs 
about other individuals’ competitiveness are gender-conditioned: the more competitive a 
female co-participant is expected to be, the more likely both men and women are to choose 
the tournament.  Beliefs about men’s competitiveness have no impact on men’s decisions 
and only a marginal influence on women’s.  
   The finding that both men and women are more likely to compete against women who 
are expected to compete themselves may at first seem surprising.  We offer two possible 
explanations.  One possibility is that an expectation that a woman will compete triggers 
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non-monetary components in both men’s and women’s utility functions, such as spite or 
envy.  By this we mean an aversion to letting the woman be the only one who chooses the 
tournament and to letting the woman get the winner’s prize ‘without a fight’.  Another 
possibility relates to social norms or expectations of conventional behavior.  There can be a 
common social practice that holds women up to more scrutiny than men, particularly in 
traditionally male-dominated spheres (see Eagly, 1995).  Recent evidence pointing to the 
importance of social learning and culture comes notably from Gneezy et al. (2009).  It 
should be noted that most of these findings, including ours, result from one-shot games in 
which participants are not given a chance to learn and to to update their beliefs regarding 
other individuals’ ability and willingness to compete.  A natural extension would be to 
allow for repeated interactions. 
   We also study the optimality of the observed pay scheme choices.  The predominant 
form of sub-optimality is that people choose the piece rate when they should have chosen 
the tournament, and women make this mistake much more frequently than men.  It is thus 
not the case that ‘men compete too much’, but rather that ‘women compete too little’. 
What environmental changes can lead to a reduction of the gap in competitiveness by 
increasing women’s competitiveness?  First, offering higher monetary incentives in the 
tournament makes women compete more, but does not reduce the gap.  Second, when 
women can choose between interacting with men or women the gender gap in 
competitiveness is reduced, perhaps due to an increased feeling of confidence of women 
(such as when relative performance feedback is provided, see Wozniak et al., 2010), but it 
remains high.  This suggests that more targeted policies are necessary to reduce this gap in 
competitiveness, such as affirmative action (Niederle et al., 2008), quotas or preferential 
treatment (Balafoutas and Sutter, 2010). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics on payment scheme choices and maze solving performance  
a) Weak gender information procedure 
 
Co-participant’s gender Participant’s gender 
Female Male 
All 
Distribution of payment schemes in absolute numbers by gender (% in parentheses) 
Females  
Piece rate 
Tournament 
     - without competition 
     - with competition 
  32 (100.00) 
21 (65.62) 
11 (34.38) 
               7 (21.88 ) 
             4 (12.50) 
  18 (100.00) 
12 (66.67) 
6 (33.33) 
                3 (16.67) 
               3 (16.67) 
 50 (100.00) 
33 (66.00) 
17 (34.00) 
               10 (20.00) 
                 7 (14.00) 
Males  
Piece rate 
Tournament 
- without competition 
- with competition 
  18 (100.00) 
 8 (44.44) 
10 (55.56) 
                 7 (38.89) 
                3 (16.67) 
  32 (100.00) 
12 (37.50) 
20 (62.50) 
               8 (25.00) 
               12 (37.50) 
 50 (100.00) 
20 (40.00) 
30 (60.00) 
               15 (30.00) 
               15 (30.00) 
Average number of mazes solved by gender and payment scheme (standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
Females 
Piece rate 
Tournament 
     - without competition 
     - with competition 
10.72 (3.20) 
11.00 (3.32)  
10.18 (3.03) 
            10.14 (3.76) 
          10.25 (1.50) 
9.83 (3.07) 
9.67 (3.20) 
10.17 (3.06) 
              8.33 (2.08) 
           12.00 (3.00) 
10.40 (3.15) 
10.52 (3.29) 
10.18 (2.94) 
            9.60 (3.34) 
           11.00 (2.24) 
Males 
Piece rate 
Tournament 
     - without competition 
     - with competition 
11.61 (3.16) 
11.50 (3.42) 
11.70 (3.13) 
            12.86 (2.34) 
          9.00 (3.46) 
13.41 (3.59) 
      11.67 (3.87) 
14.45 (3.05) 
           16.00 (2.20) 
          13.42 (3.18) 
12.76 (3.52) 
11.60 (3.60) 
13.53 (3.30) 
           14.53 (2.72) 
          12.53 (3.60) 
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b) Strong gender information procedure 
 
Co-participant’s gender Participant’s gender 
Female Male 
All 
Distribution of payment schemes in absolute numbers by gender (% in parentheses) 
Females  
Piece rate 
Tournament 
     - without competition 
     - with competition 
  12 (100.00) 
9 (75.00) 
3 (25.00) 
               3  (25.00) 
             0   (0.00) 
  8 (100.00) 
6 (75.00) 
2 (25.00) 
             0 (0.00) 
             2 (25.00) 
 20 (100.00) 
15 (75.00) 
 5 (25.00) 
               3 (15.00) 
               2 (10.00) 
Males  
Piece rate 
Tournament 
- without competition 
- with competition 
  8 (100.00) 
3 (37.50) 
5 (62.50) 
                 2 (25.00) 
                 3 (37.50) 
  12 (100.00) 
8 (66.67) 
4 (33.33) 
             4 (33.33) 
            0  (0.00) 
 20 (100.00) 
11 (55.00) 
 9 (45.00) 
               6 (30.00) 
               3 (15.00) 
Average number of mazes solved by gender and payment scheme (standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
Females 
Piece rate 
Tournament 
     - without competition 
     - with competition 
12.17 (2.69) 
11.78 (3.03)  
13.33 (0.58) 
          13.33 (0.58) 
          -  (-) 
13.25 (3.77) 
13.33 (4.27) 
13.00 (2.83) 
            - (-) 
          13.00 (2.83) 
12.06 (3.12) 
12.40 (3.52) 
13.20 (1.48) 
            13.33 (0.58) 
           13.00 (2.83) 
Males 
Piece rate 
Tournament 
     - without competition 
     - with competition 
12.50 (2.62) 
12.67 (4.04) 
12.40 (1.95) 
            12.50 (2.12) 
          12.33 (2.31) 
13.58 (3.40) 
      13.25 (3.99) 
14.25 (2.06) 
         14.25 (2.06) 
         - (-) 
13.15 (3.08) 
13.09 (3.81) 
13.22 (2.11) 
         13.67 (2.07) 
        12.33 (2.31) 
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Table 2. Determinants of the tournament payment scheme choice (probit models) 
Dependent variable: Tournament 
entry 
All  
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
Women 
(3) 
Men 
(4) 
Male participant 
 
Male participant – Strong 
information procedure 
 
Male co-participant 
 
Male co-participant 
- Strong information procedure 
 
Man matched with a man 
 
Man matched with a man – 
Strong information procedure 
 
Man matched with a woman 
 
Man matched with a woman–
Strong information procedure 
 
Woman matched with a woman 
 
Woman matched with a woman–
Strong information procedure 
 
Strong gender information 
procedure 
 
Risk score 
 
Risk score * man 
 
Predicted entry rate of men if 
male co-participant 
Predicted entry rate of women if 
female co-participant 
Predicted ability of men if male 
co-participant 
Predicted ability of women if 
female co-participant 
Own ability 
 
Other demographics (age and 
experience) 
0.974*** 
(0.067)  
0.235  
(0.220)  
 
 -0.020 
(0.526)  
-0.371***  
(0.135) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
0.060 
(0.191)  
 
0.026** 
(0.012)  
-0.038**  
(0.016)  
0.004 
(0.004)  
0.014*** 
(0.005)  
-0.075**  
(0.039)  
-0.132*** 
(0.040)  
0.094*** 
(0.028)  
Yes 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
0.965*** 
(0.058) 
0.002  
(0.312) 
  
0.880*** 
(0.095)  
 0.559*** 
 (0.157)  
 
0.006  
(0.544)  
0.201 
(0.344)  
 
-0.256 
(0.220)  
 
0.029**  
(0.012)  
-0.042**  
(0.017)  
0.004 
 (0.004) 
 0.014***  
(0.005)  
-0.083** 
 (0.039) 
-0.144*** 
 (0.042)  
0.103*** 
(0.030) 
Yes 
- 
 
- 
 
 
0.384 
(0.838)  
-0.213  
(0.188) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
0.097 
(0.238)  
 
0.034*** 
(0.013)  
- 
  
0.013* 
(0.007)  
0.011* 
(0.006)  
-0.182***  
(0.069)  
-0.144*** 
(0.051)  
0.098** 
(0.039)  
Yes 
- 
 
- 
 
  
0.029 
(0.851)  
-0.639***  
(0.141) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
0.426* 
(0.220)  
 
-0.015 
(0.015)  
- 
  
<0.001 
(0.005)  
0.016** 
(0.007)  
-0.044 
(0.055)  
-0.125* 
(0.070)  
0.120*** 
(0.045)  
Yes 
LR χ2 
Prob>χ2 
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
N 
33.38 
0.002 
-65.132 
0.204 
120 
35.25 
0.004 
-64.197 
0.215 
120 
26.39 
0.006 
-25.653 
0.340 
60 
20.16 
0.043 
-31.507 
0.242 
60 
Note: Marginal effects are indicated with their level of significance. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. The mean values 
of the independent variables are displayed in Appendix 3. 
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Table 3. Percentage of observed pay scheme choices that were optimal, conditional on own 
and co-participant's gender.  
 
Piece rate Tournament Actual choice 
Female  
co-participant 
Male  
co-participant 
Female 
co-participant 
Male 
co-participant 
Weak gender information procedure 
Women 0.00 16.66 100.00 83.33 
Men  0.00 58.33 100.00 90.00 
Strong gender information procedure 
Women 0.00 50.00 100.00 50.00 
Men  0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 4. Average expected earnings gain from switching from observed sub-optimal 
payment scheme to other payment scheme. 
Gain from switching from piece 
rate to tournament 
Gain from switching from tournament 
to piece rate  
 
Gender Female 
co-participant 
Male 
co-participant 
Female  
co-participant 
Male  
co-participant 
Weak gender information procedure 
Woman  15.75 (35.79%) 12.72 (18.00%) - 4.68 (24.22%) 
Man  14.15 (30.77%) 15.07 (24.79%) - 6.6 (19.85%) 
Strong gender information procedure 
Woman  13.67 (28.22 %) 34.00 (50.00 %) - 3.78 (9.39 %) 
Man  19.08 (38.00 %) 15.95 (30.09 %) - - 
Note: Numbers are the absolute gain in points (1 point = 0.25 Euro). Numbers in parentheses are the 
percentage gain. A “-“ indicates that there are no observations (i.e., all subjects made optimal pay scheme 
choices).  
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Figure 1. Percentages of individuals choosing the tournament in the Baseline, the                 
Incentive and the Partner Choice treatments in each gender configuration 
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Appendix 1. Overview of experimental sessions 
 
# session 
 
 
Treatment Information on 
correspondence 
of pseudonym 
and gender 
Question on the 
expected co-
participant’s 
choice 
# participants 
(women/men) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Incentives 
Incentives 
Incentives 
Baseline 
Baseline 
Baseline 
Choice Partner 
Choice Partner 
Choice Partner 
Choice Partner 
Baseline 
Baseline 
Baseline 
Baseline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
20 (9/11) 
20 (10/10) 
20 (11/9) 
20 (10/10) 
20 (10/10) 
20 (10/10) 
20 (10/10) 
20 (10/10) 
20 (10/10) 
20 (11/9) 
20 (11/9) 
20 (9/11) 
20 (10/10) 
20 (10/10) 
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Appendix 2. Risk Distributions 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of risk scores by payment scheme  
 
 
 
Piece rate 
Tournament 
Tournament 
Piece rate 
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Appendix 3. Mean values of the variables in the regressions reported in Table 2 
Dependent variable: Tournament 
entry 
All  
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
Females 
 
Males 
Male participant 
 
Male participant*Strong information 
 
Male co-participant 
 
Male co-participant* Strong 
information 
 
Man matched with a man 
 
Man matched with a man* Strong 
information 
 
Man matched with a woman 
 
Man matched with a woman* Strong 
information 
 
Woman matched with a woman 
 
Woman matched with a woman* 
Strong information 
Strong information sessions 
 
Risk score 
 
Risk score * man 
 
Predicted entry rate of men if male 
co-participant 
Predicted entry rate of women if 
female co-participant 
Predicted ability of men if male co-
participant 
Predicted ability of women if female 
co-participant 
Own ability 
 
Age 
 
Experience 
 
0.500 
 (0.502)  
0.167  
(0.374)  
 0.500 
(0.502)  
0.167  
(0.374) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.333 
(0.473)  
48.608 
(6.735)  
24.617 
(25.153)  
31.326 
(34.602)  
20.744 
(24.276)  
5.958 
(6.274)  
5.017 
(5.394)  
11.992 
(3.501)  
21.733 
(2.393) 
0.575 
(0.496) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
0.317 
(0.467) 
0.100  
(0.301)  
 
0.183 
(0.389)  
 0.067 
 (0.250)  
 
0.317  
(0.467)  
0.100 
(0.301)  
0.333 
(0.473)  
48.608 
(6.735)  
24.617 
(25.153)  
31.326 
(34.602)  
20.744 
(24.276)  
5.958 
(6.274)  
5.017 
(5.394)  
11.992 
(3.501)  
21.733 
(2.393) 
0.575 
(0.496) 
- 
 
- 
 
0.367 
(0.486)  
0.133  
(0.343) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.333 
(0.475)  
47.983 
(6.866)  
- 
  
24.500 
(34.915)  
25.991 
(23.417)  
4.283 
(5.926)  
6.350 
(5.355)  
11.100 
(3.338)  
21.200 
(1.735) 
0.533 
(0.503) 
- 
 
- 
 
 0.633 
(0.486)  
0.200  
(0.403) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.333 
(0.475)  
49.233 
(6.601)  
- 
  
38.153 
(33.181)  
15.497 
(24.173)  
7.633 
(6.211)  
3.683 
(5.137)  
12.883 
(3.460)  
22.267 
(2.822) 
0.617 
(0.490) 
N 120 120 60 60 
Note that the mean values of the variables interacted with a dummy variable are relatively low since the 
interacted dummy variable is either equal to 1 or to 0. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Supplementary material (SM) 
SM1. Instructions 
(These instructions are for the Baseline treatment – the instructions for the other treatments 
are available upon request) You	  are	  participating	  in	  an	  experiment	  on	  decision-­‐making.	  During	  this	  session,	  you	  can	  earn	  money.	  The	  amount	   of	   your	   earnings	   depends	   on	   your	   decisions	   and	   the	   decisions	   of	   another	   participant	   you	  will	  interact	  with.	   During	   the	   session,	   your	   earnings	   are	   expressed	   in	   points	  with	   the	   following	   conversion	  rule:	   1	  point	  =	  0.25	  €	  At	  the	  end	  of	   the	  session,	  you	  will	  be	  paid	   in	  cash	  your	  earnings	  obtained	  during	  this	  session	  after	  they	  have	   been	   converted	   into	   Euros.	   	  We	  will	   add	   up	   to	   these	   earnings	   an	   additional	   amount	   of	   money	   (a	  show-­‐up	   fee	   of	   2	   €	   +	   a	   minimum	   amount	   of	   2	   €	   for	   your	   participation	   to	   a	   post-­‐experimental	  questionnaire).	  You	  will	  get	  paid	  in	  a	  separate	  room	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  confidentiality,	  on	  presentation	  of	   the	  ticket	   that	  you	  have	  randomly	  drawn	  from	  the	  envelope	  upon	  entering	  the	   laboratory.	  The	  whole	  session	  lasts	  about	  one	  hour	  long.	  Before	   starting	   the	   session,	   you	   are	   kindly	   requested	   to	   supply	   some	   personal	   information	   about	   your	  gender,	  your	  age,	  your	  school,	  your	  level	  and	  field	  of	  studies	  and	  whether	  you	  have	  already	  participated	  in	  an	  experiment	  in	  economics.	  These	  anonymous	  pieces	  of	  information	  will	  remain	  confidential.	  	  
During this session, you will perform a task on your computer. This task consists of solving mazes.  You are 
going to practice now by solving three mazes in order to get familiar with the task at hand.  
 
As soon as you click the button “start”, a maze appears on your screen. Starting from the green point located at 
the left of your screen, you can move around in this maze by using the mouse of your computer. The path you 
follow appears in green and a marker always indicates your current position in the maze. You can move forward, 
stop or restart from any point already reached whenever you want.  You can also give up a maze before solving 
it and make another one appear by clicking the button “next”. The maze is solved as soon as you reach the red 
point located at the right of the screen. You are always shown the time you have spent since you clicked the 
“start” button. All the participants can see the same three mazes. 
 
When you have completed these three practice periods, you will be requested to answer the following question: 
“In your opinion, how many mazes do you think you could solve in 15 minutes?”. The results of these practice 
periods and the answer to this question have definitely no consequences for the rest of the session, either for the 
person you will interact with, or for your earnings. After a moment, you will receive the instructions for the rest 
of the session. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. Someone will answer your questions privately. Throughout 
the entire session, talking is not allowed. 	  
 
Instructions (continued) 
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[The instructions below were distributed to the participants when all of them had completed the practice periods 
and answered the question] 
 
During this session, you are paired with another participant.  
 
Both you and the participant you are paired with have to perform a task. The task consists of solving mazes 
during a limited period of time of 15 minutes. The number of mazes you solve contributes to determine your 
earnings. The session consists of two stages. 
 
In the first stage, you are allocated a pseudonym(a fake first name) and we inform you on the pseudonym given 
to your co-participant. Your co-participant is simultaneously informed on your pseudonym. If you are a woman, 
your pseudonym is a female name, and if you are a man your pseudonym is a male name. Similarly, if your co-
participant is a man, his pseudonym will be a male name, and if your co-participant is a woman, her pseudonym 
will be a female name. [The last two sentences were only mentioned in the two sessions of the Baseline treatment 
with more salient information  on gender] 
Next, you choose simultaneously between two possible modes of payment, Mode A and Mode B. Your choice of 
the mode of payment and the choice of your co-participant determine the number of points you receive for each 
maze you solve personally. 
 
You choose 
 
And your co-
participant 
chooses 
 
You receive personally 
 
Mode A 
 
 
Mode A 
or mode B 
 
 
4 points for each maze you solve, no matter the number of 
mazes solved by the participant you are paired with  
 
Mode B 
 
Mode A 
 
6 points for each maze you solve, no matter the number of 
mazes solved by the participant you are paired with  
 
 
Mode B 
 
 
Mode B 
 
 
6 points for each 
maze you solve if 
you solve more 
mazes than your 
co-participant 
 
 
1 point for each 
maze you solve if 
you solve fewer 
mazes than your 
co-participant. 
 
 
If you solve the 
same number of 
mazes as your co-
participant, a 
random draw 
determines which 
of you two receives 
6 points for each 
maze solved and 
which of you two 
receives 1 point for 
each maze  solved. 
You choose between Mode A and Mode B by clicking one of the two buttons available on your computer screen. 
Your choice is registered once you click “OK”. 
You are informed  of the choice of your co-participant before moving to the second stage and your co-participant 
is informed on your choice. 
 
In the second stage, you perform the task of solving mazes during 15 minutes. Time is deducted as soon as you 
click the “start” button. To make a new maze appear on your screen, you can click the “next” button. The 
number of mazes you have currently solved is always visible on your screen, as the time already spent since the 
beginning of the task solving. All the mazes have a solution. All the participants receive the same mazes in the 
same order. 
 
At the end of the 15-minute period, you are informed about your payoff and the session is over. Then you are 
asked to fill out a post-experimental questionnaire, the details of which will be shown on your screen. 
 If	  you	  have	  any	  questions,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand.	  Someone	  will	  answer	  your	  questions	  privately.	  
 ------------------ 
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SM2. Post-experimental questionnaire 
You are kindly requested to answer the following questionnaire that consists of two parts. By 
answering these questions, you can earn between 2 and 6 Euros more. The answers to these questions 
are anonymous and confidential. Communication is not allowed. 
1st part. You will receive 1 Euro for each correct answer to the following questions. 
For your information, in this session, there were   ___ women and __ men. 
Question 1. In your opinion, what is the average number of mazes solved by the women in this 
session (including yourself if you are a woman)? 
 
Question 2. In your opinion, what is the average number of mazes solved by the men in this session 
(including yourself if you are a man)? 
 
Question 3. In your opinion, how many women in this session have chosen mode B (including 
yourself if you are a woman)? 
 
Question 4. In your opinion, how many men in this session have chosen mode B (including yourself if 
you are a man)? 
 
2nd part. You earn 2 € for sure  by answering the following 16 questions. 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you engage in each activity or 
behavior, by using the following scale, and by entering a number between 1 (very unlikely) and 5 
(very likely): 
 
               1                              2                               3              4                       5 
Very unlikely                  Unlikely                     Not sure         Likely             Very likely 
 
Betting a day’s income at a high stake playing cards game :                        ___         
Getting close to a river in flood to take pictures that  
     you can sell to the press:                                                                             ___                                                                                        
Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund:    ___ 
Defending an unpopular issue that you believe in at a social occasion:         ___ 
Co-signing a new car loan for a friend:                                                            ___ 
Deciding to share an apartment with somebody you don’t know well:           ___ 
Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock:                   ___ 
Going camping in the wild:                                                                              ___ 
Taking a week’s income to play at the casino:                                                 ___ 
Going on a two-week vacation in a third-world country without  
prearranged hotel accommodation:                                ___ 
Spending money impulsively without thinking about the consequences:        ___ 
Trying bungee jumping:                                                                     ___                                                          
Lending a friend  an amount of money equivalent to one  
      month ‘s income:                                                                                         ___ 
Investing in a business that has a good chance of failing:                                ___ 
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Approaching your boss to ask for a raise:                                      ___ 
Dating someone you are working with:                             ___ 
 
 
SM3. Tests of robustness of our procedures 
The beliefs about payment scheme choices are measured after the participant received 
feedback about the co-participant’s choice. A participant thus knew the choice of one 
participant out of 19 other participants in the session, and this could have influenced his 
reported beliefs. Therefore, we compare the beliefs of women when their co-participant of a 
specific gender has chosen the piece rate with their beliefs when the co-participant of the 
same gender has chosen the tournament. The same comparisons are made for men. Mann-
Whitney tests indicate that neither women nor men’s beliefs are influenced by their co-
participant’s decision. Women report similar beliefs on entry rates when their co-participant 
has chosen the piece rate and when he has chosen the tournament (p = 0.302 when matched 
with a woman and p = 0.945 when matched with a man), and similarly for men (p = 0.409 
when matched with a woman and p = 0.794 when matched with a man).  
   Furthermore, in four sessions participants stated their beliefs about their co-participant’s 
choice after they had made their own payment scheme choice, but before they learned the co-
participant’s choice. An accurate answer was paid €1. We find that among those participants 
who were matched with a woman and who believed this woman entered the tournament (did 
not enter), 66.67% (29.03%, respectively) chose the tournament. Among those participants 
who were matched with a man and who believed this man entered the tournament (did not 
enter), 47.62% (21.05%, respectively) chose the tournament. This suggests that expecting the 
co-participant to enter the competition increases the individual’s likelihood of competing, 
especially if the co-participant is a woman.  This is consistent with the findings reported in 
Table 2. Eliciting beliefs about their co-participant’s payment scheme choice before or after 
they learned the co-participant’s choice leads to the same qualitative analysis.  
Consider next the measurement of beliefs about ability. Here a potential bias could arise 
due to the fact that a participant states his belief after he has been informed on whether he 
won or lost the tournament in case both players competed. A participant never received any 
feedback on the performance of his co-participant, but in a two-person tournament he knew 
whether he performed better or not. This information might have influenced the beliefs about 
performance levels. Whereas eliciting beliefs before decision-making could have focused 
participants’ attention on the co-participant’s gender and hence affected their decisions 
artificially, eliciting them before informing the participants about the competition outcome 
could have been preferable. In fact, the data shows that being informed about one’s success or 
failure does not impact the predictions. Mann-Whitney tests indicate that among those 
participants matched with women, there is no significant difference in beliefs about female 
performance between those who were involved in a two-person tournament and those who 
chose the tournament but did not compete (p = 0.736). Also, there is no significant difference 
in beliefs between the winners and the losers of these two-person tournaments (p = 0.245). 
The conclusions are similar when one considers participants who were matched with a man 
and chose the tournament (p = 0.979 and p = 0.124, respectively). We thus believe that there 
is no noticeable bias in the way we elicited beliefs about other participants’ payment scheme 
choices and abilities.  
